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THE PERSISTENCE OF TRADITIONAL CONCEPTS IN MODERN CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY
1977 J H GREER

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
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FOREIGN RELATIONS

BY

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↙ A problem faced by many students of post-liberation China is the understanding of her foreign relations. In her twenty-eight years of existence, the People's Republic of China has demonstrated a uniquely erratic manner in her dealings with other nations. ↙ At times she has shown herself hostile and bellicose; at other times she has appeared conciliatory and peaceful. At times she has challenged nations not agreeing with her; at other times she has sought cooperation under the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. The PRC has gone from a policy of friendship with the Soviet Union (at least on the surface) to outright armed conflict. She has vacillated from identifying the U.S. as her principal enemy to promoting the more conciliatory tone of the Shanghai Communiqué. She has gone from the nearly total diplomatic isolation of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution to a period of major diplomatic exchanges and initiatives. Considering the relatively short span of her existence, these fluctuations in foreign relations appear all the more obvious and dramatic; hence, they generate the need for an explanation as to why the Chinese have conducted their affairs as they have.

A number of scholars have put forward explanations for the method and rationale of Chinese foreign relations. Some see the PRC's actions as reflecting her Marxism-Leninism-

Thought of Mao Tse-Tung ideology.¹ Others see China's foreign relations as based on nationalism.² Still others assess these relations in terms of frustrations and capabilities.³ Frequently cited as the underlying cause of China's external actions are her domestic politics.⁴ Certainly all of these have a role in the making of Chinese foreign relations and, to a greater or lesser extent, influence their direction and nature.

To the above factors, I would add the influence of traditional Chinese concepts of world order and foreign relations. Despite the efforts of the Communist government to eliminate traditional thinking and institutions, the more than 2,000 year old culture and lifestyle fade slowly from the mind and reemerge from time to time. This paper purports to examine modern (post-1949) Chinese foreign relations to determine the persistence of traditional foreign relations concepts and attitudes in them. It will begin by defining the elements of traditional foreign relations. From this framework, it will assess modern foreign relations for similarities and parallels.

The reader is cautioned that it is not the author's intent to imply that modern Chinese foreign relations can be understood strictly as modern day usage of the traditional methods and ideas. Traditional concepts are seen, however, as one among the several factors previously mentioned which

influence Chinese foreign relations. As a result, an appreciation of the role of tradition is essential to an overall understanding of this subject.

To add clarity to subsequent discussion, it is necessary to define several terms. First, foreign relations as it will be used in this paper denotes the sum total of dealings and interaction between states. It includes formal relations conducted through established diplomatic channels as well as informal contacts manifest in trade, cultural exchanges, and other forms of what the Chinese call people-to-people diplomacy. It includes formal interaction through treaties and other agreements as well as less formal interaction in the form of propaganda and support for clandestine activities.

Closely related to foreign relations is foreign policy. Foreign policy will designate the conscious efforts of a government to plan and direct its activities and relations with another state. It consists of selected objectives which define its intents and goals in foreign relations. In addition to objectives, foreign policy consists of efforts to mobilize the means to achieve its objectives and the actual expenditure of effort and resources in pursuit of the objectives. In short, foreign policy represents one state's efforts to direct its relations with other states. Foreign relations is the product of that foreign policy.

Other terms requiring explanation are traditional and modern foreign relations. Traditional foreign relations, which will be defined in detail below, ^{was} China's system of interacting with other states prior to 1842 and the signing of the Treaty of Nanking. This event marks the end of traditional foreign relations, generally referred to as the tributary system, and the beginning of foreign relations of a totally different nature under the treaty-port system. As for modern foreign policy and relations, these are China's policy and relations with other states since 1 October 1949 when the Chinese Communists officially claimed power.

"China" as it will be used in this paper will refer, in the modern context, to the People's Republic of China (PRC). "Taiwan" will be used to designate the Republic of China (ROC) which occupies that island. In the traditional context, there will, of course, be no need for any such differentiations.

As a final introductory note, the reader is cautioned concerning the myth and the reality of Chinese foreign relations. For example, according to the "myth" contained in the Ch'ing Dynasty records, Lord Macartney performed the Kowtow when presented to the Emperor in 1793. In reality, Lord Macartney refused to perform this act of submission.⁵ This illustration vividly demonstrates the difference between

what should have occurred according to tradition (myth) and what in fact did happen (reality). Even the most cursory survey of Chinese history will reveal other examples where reality failed to coincide with the Chinese concepts of what should have happened. Nevertheless, for the purposes of this paper, it is the "myth" that will generally be emphasized. Since the myth reflects the attitudes and concepts underlying traditional foreign relations, it is the legacy of the myth that one would expect to find in modern foreign relations.

The origins of Chinese foreign relations lie in the traditional belief of Chinese superiority. As a result, it is probable that Chinese foreign relations existed in at least a rudimentary form as early as the Chou and even the Shang period when the Chinese began to consider themselves a distinct and unique people.⁶ Their contacts with the nomads of the north and west and the aborigines of the south served not only to reinforce the distinctiveness of their agrarian-based culture, but also caused them to consider themselves superior to the non-Chinese or barbarian groups. Not only were they superior in military power and material possessions, but their use of a written language and later, their adherence to the Confucian code of conduct, caused them to attribute

their superiority to their culture and way of life.⁷ This superior culture, in turn, made them superior to others morally as the Chinese considered their cultural beliefs to be universally valid and applicable.

From this perspective of cultural and moral supremacy, the Chinese came to view the world with China, or the Middle Kingdom as they called it, at its center. China was an island of civilization surrounded by less civilized, hence inferior, barbarians. This cultural egocentric and sinocentric world view was largely unchallenged by events. Non-Chinese were either defeated militarily or adopted the superior Chinese culture. Furthermore, geography effectively isolated the Chinese from contacts with the other high civilizations in India and around the Mediterranean.

Related to this view of the world and essential to foreign relations was the Chinese concept of political power. The Chinese Emperor, or Son of Heaven, was the appointed representative of Heaven on earth. His authority, embodied in the Mandate of Heaven, was given to him by Heaven for the purpose of maintaining cosmic harmony and order. He accomplished this task by ruling with virtue and by performing the necessary rituals to insure Heaven's approval. Should he fail to rule properly, which became evident when harmony and order on earth were lost, Heaven revoked its Mandate and bestowed it upon someone else more deserving. As the guardian of cosmic harmony, the Emperor was not restricted in

the use of his power to China. Since his power was based on virtue, a virtue that emerged from the universally valid Chinese culture, it was evident that his power was universal and that he was the ruler of "all under Heaven." Thus, not only was China seen as superior to all non-Chinese culturally, but because it was superior culturally and hence, morally, it was also, according to the Chinese theory, superior politically. From this line of ~~thought~~ evolved the fundamental axiom of Chinese foreign relations: China was the civilized center of an otherwise barbarian world and as a result was and should be the dominant state.

Well before the founding of the Ch'in Dynasty in 221 B.C., foreign relations had been a subject of philosophical debate. With China unified by the Ch'in, however, this matter took on greater importance and relevance. As a result, both the reporting of and the explanation of foreign relations became a subject worthy of the attention of the great Han historian, Ssu-ma Ch'ien. He noted in his history that earlier sources had shown that barbarian submission and the bringing of tribute to the Middle Kingdom was the proper basis of foreign relations. He tried to expand this into a general theory of foreign relations which could reconcile such extremes in policy as the expansionism of Han Wu-ti and the peaceful policy of Han Wen-ti. His problems in developing

a viable theory were further compounded by the military strength of the Hsiung-nu who refused to submit before Chinese cultural superiority. This situation, coupled with the seeming inequality of relations amongst the various barbarian tribes (e.g., the Hsuing-nu treated other tribes as inferiors), caused Ssu-ma Ch'ien to conclude that foreign relations were unequal and unstable because they were a function of military power.⁸

Ssu-ma Ch'ien's successor, Pan Ku, also attempted to develop a theory of imperial foreign relations. Pan Ku departed from the earlier ideas which required physical subduction of barbarians and their subsequent enrollment into the empire. He chose instead to base his theory on the separation of Inner (Chinese) people and Outer (non-Chinese) peoples. Pan Ku advocated termination of formal relations between the two groups. He also advised that the Chinese should avoid aggressive wars with the Outer peoples. Furthermore, Pan Ku maintained that efforts to control the barbarians should only be made when the latter approached China's borders. When barbarians departed from China, Pan Ku cautioned that they be carefully watched. Pan Ku justified his policy of declining to deal actively with barbarians as reflective of Chinese superiority. To solidify his theory, Pan Ku became one of many Chinese historians to record events so as to support the theory rather than to accurately report the facts. As a result, all Hsiung-nu

missions, and those of other barbarian states, sent to China, were recorded as tribute-bearing. By this time it appears, the Chinese had come to believe that all their relationships with other countries were tributary in nature.⁹ Thus, from Han times, Chinese foreign relations were, in theory, designed to separate the Chinese from their culturally inferior neighbors. It only followed that barbarian contacts with China should be regulated as befitted China's culturally superior status.

Although the fall of the later Han in 220 A.D. and capture of North China by the barbarian T'o-pa Wei in 386 A.D. raised doubts as to China's superiority, Pan Ku's theory of foreign relations remained largely in tact.¹⁰ When China was again reunited under the Sui and T'ang dynasties starting in the late sixth century, however, historians chose to modify it so that it better suited events and the newly revitalized Confucian theory. As a result, foreign relations became a function of te or virtue. Just as good government and domestic strength were the product of te, the historians agreed that it was the presence of te that persuaded people outside the empire to submit to the Son of Heaven. They concluded that "where there was te ... the foreign countries came in peace and came respectfully."¹¹

Because of the military successes of early T'ang, the T'ang historians concluded that te was a product and a

function of power. Throughout most of the T'ang years, this relationship suited the traditional notion that Chinese te was great and glorious; however, it left the Chinese historians perplexed in explaining the difficulties of the Sung Dynasty at the hands of the Ch'i-tans, the Jurcheds, and the Mongols. Finally, during the early Ming, a suitable answer to the problem of relating te to power was developed. Obviously, the Mongols had power, but certainly, at least from a Chinese perspective, they lacked virtue. The Sung, in turn, were seen as lacking power even though they surely possessed te. It would seem then that these two concepts were not so related as had been supposed by T'ang historians. The Ming answer was that it was proper to wield power so long as the ruler possessed te; it was improper if he lacked te. As a result, use of power without te was doomed to fail and thus the Mongols passed from power relatively quickly. Successes resulted from a proper balance of te and power.¹²

This discussion of te adds still another dimension to the development of Chinese foreign relations. Power and virtue were not seen as contradictory forces, but as complementary forces which required balance. It would seem that striking such a balance was a motivating factor behind the voyages

of Cheng-Ho. These expeditions seem to be classic examples of the combination of imperial glory and imperial force in conducting foreign relations.¹³

From these very generally described concepts and beginnings evolved the institutionalized form of Chinese foreign relations called the tributary system. This system, which reached its peak during the Ming and continued into the Ch'ing period, represented what is referred to as traditional foreign relations. As such, it provided a framework through which the Chinese world could be ordered as well as a mechanism for conducting diplomacy and international trade.

The tributary system was a highly structured and regulated system of relationships between China and the various barbarian states. Inasmuch as Pan Ku and other historians and philosophers from at least Han times forward had advocated minimizing contacts with Outer peoples, it followed that such intercourse as ensued from this system was highly controlled by the Chinese. Those barbarians who wished to enter into relations with China were permitted to do so but only as China's vassals. As such, they agreed to acknowledge the supremacy of the Emperor and to obey his commands.¹⁴ In recognition of this relationship, the tributary ruler was required to dispatch missions to China in accordance with a frequency determined by the Chinese, bearing tribute of local products or rare and strange objects.¹⁵ In addition, the

envoy of the tributary ruler was required to perform the rituals associated with tribute-bringing of which the most notable was the Kowtow which symbolized submission to the Son of Heaven.

Rules governing tributary missions were strict. The mission was to approach China only at a predetermined location on the frontier. The total size of the mission was limited to one hundred men of whom only twenty were permitted to go on to the capital. A mission approaching China from the sea was, in like manner, required to put in at a specified port and could number no more than three ships of one hundred men each. Again, only twenty men could go on to the capital. Missions were closely escorted from their point of arrival to the capital. Once in the capital, all tributary missions were housed in an official Residence for Tributary Envoys. In fact, throughout the duration of their stay in China, envoys were cared for at court expense. At the conclusion of their mission, they were again escorted back to the frontier.¹⁶

As was mentioned above, tributary missions were scheduled to be sent at regular intervals. Generally those states closest to China sent missions most frequently. For example, Korea sent a mission annually while Siam, Champa and Annam sent missions once every three years. Japan, separated from direct Chinese influence by the sea, was only required to send tribute once every ten years.¹⁷ The actual presentation of tribute usually occurred at a great audience at the New Year.¹⁸

A significant feature of tributary missions was the opportunity they provided for trade between the barbarians and China. China was, in theory, self-sufficient and did not need the products of the tributary states. However, under the pretext of conferring a boon on the barbarians, the Son of Heaven did permit limited trade. This act, of course, allowed the barbarians to share in the bounty of China. While the missions were away at the capital, merchants who had accompanied them were permitted to trade at the frontier. Also, since merchants were often a part of the twenty man party that went to the capital, a three to five day trading period was permitted at the capital. Of course, the items and the quantity of trade were regulated by the Chinese.¹⁹

The reciprocal aspects of the tributary system were also quite reflective of the superior position of China in this relationship. Tributary rulers were conferred noble rank making them vassals of the Chinese Emperor. They also received an imperial patent of appointment which officially recognized their status as tributary rulers. An imperial seal was provided them for proper signing of their tributary memorials. Envoys were also presented gifts from the emperor which were supposedly of greater value than the tribute brought. Participation in the tributary system symbolized admittance to the sinocentric world.²⁰ In return for submitting to the Son of Heaven, the tributary ruler knew that

China would assist him with aid in time of trouble or natural calamity and would properly represent him before Heaven in ceremony and ritual.²¹

The tributary system also fulfilled other diplomatic functions for the Chinese. Envoys were dispatched to invest new tributary rulers with their imperial seals and patents of appointment. These occasions offered the Chinese envoy an opportunity to negotiate with the new ruler as well as to spy on his defenses.²² Envoys were also dispatched to convey imperial condolences on the occasion of a tributary ruler's death. On at least one occasion, such an envoy was accompanied by an army which allowed him to influence succession and to more forcefully negotiate future relations with the new ruler.²³

It is appropriate to ask what caused the various tributary states to participate in this system of relations. Officially, barbarians came in response to the unequalled virtue of the Emperor. Despite this theoretical attraction, the prime inducement seems to have been the opportunity for trade in China. There are reports that trade with China was so advantageous that merchants from Central Asia and parts further west would falsify documents to make themselves appear as emissaries of various little known Asian kingdoms. With this official status they were able to gain admittance to China for trade.²⁴ Although this was a primary advantage,

a fundamental reason for participation, however, was that the tributary state might have no other choice. A major motive for dispatching the expeditions of Ch'eng-Ho during the early fifteenth century was to enroll new states into the tributary system. These expeditions, of course, used power to make up for any failures of states to properly respond to China's te. It was also during this period that the tributary system reached its peak in participation. The forced nature of tributary participation is also evident in the fact that the most regular bearers of tribute were those states located on the periphery of China (i.e., Korea, Annam and the Ryukyu Islands) and hence, most easily influenced.

This discussion of the tributary system and the process through which it developed reveals a number of principles and basic attitudes underlying traditional Chinese foreign relations. Perhaps the most fundamental of these is the concept of Chinese superiority. As has been indicated, the Chinese considered themselves superior to all others in all respects but most importantly in culture. This sense of cultural superiority produced other conclusions which bore directly on their concept of foreign relations.

First, this feeling of cultural superiority led the Chinese to differentiate between themselves and others based on cultural rather than racial or national differences. Since culture was a quality which could be acquired by conscious action rather than solely a product of one's birth, the Chinese came to see differences between themselves and

others differently than was the case in Europe. In Europe, people were organized into political groups based on race and geographic proximity to one another under the nation-state concept. In China, however, the nation-state concept did not develop because the birth-related basis for the nation-state was considered subordinate to one's level of cultural achievement. It was this latter classification rather than birth that the Chinese used to identify people politically as Chinese or non-Chinese. Since China considered herself culturally superior to all other groups, the western concept of equality among states failed to emerge. As a result, foreign relations were seen as properly hierarchical and dominated by China. The Kowtow was a perfect symbol of China's concept of foreign relations.

Resulting from this cultural basis for differentiating between political groups was China's failure to develop a sense of nationalism. In Europe, where the national identification factors (i.e., race, geographic location, etc.) were fixed by birth, competition between the theoretically equal nation-states was inevitable. In China though, interaction between Chinese and barbarians caused the latter to be awed by the greatness of the Middle Kingdom. Rather than compete, the barbarians, to Chinese thinking, sought to adopt this superior Chinese lifestyle. As a result, cultural absorption or sinicization, not European nationalistic competition, was the product of Chinese/barbarian contacts.

Since China differentiated between herself and others in cultural terms rather than by nationalities occupying specific geographic locations, the concept of delimited and demarcated borders did not gain great importance. With the possible exception of the Great Wall, China made no real effort to precisely define the extent of her territory in the western sense until the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries when she was compelled to do so. Instead of borders, China observed less exact frontiers as a means of separating herself from her neighbors.

Also a product of China's sense of cultural superiority was her previously mentioned sinocentric view of the world. Fairbank has described the world as the traditional Chinese saw it as surrounding China proper in three zones. These zones reflect cultural as well as geographic relationship to China.²⁵

The first zone, the Sinic Zone, consisted of those tributaries closest geographically and most similar culturally to China: Korea, Annam and the Ryukyu Islands. The Inner Asian Zone, largely a western extension of the Sinic Zone, was composed of tributary tribes and states of the nomadic or semi-nomadic peoples of northern Manchuria, Mongolia, Sinkiang and Tibet. These groups, although bordering China, were not only ethnically and culturally non-Chinese, they were, unlike the Sinic Zone peoples, outside or on the very

fringe of the Chinese cultural area. Finally, there was the Outer Zone which included the rest of the world.²⁶ These zones reflect a decreasing cultural closeness to China. Areas of the Sinic Zone were obviously better able to adopt the agrarian culture of China than were the peoples of the Central Asian steppe and deserts. As such, these zones also represent decreasing degrees of Chinese influence on the zone inhabitants. Conversely, as will be outlined below, these zones reflect decreasing degrees of Chinese affinity for the areas.

These zonal boundaries were certainly not permanent as they fluctuated in accordance with Chinese power and the power of various Central Asian nomadic groups. During the Yüan Dynasty, China proper as was ruled by the Sung, was absorbed by the Mongols from the Inner Asian Zone. During the T'ang dynasty, however, China pushed its influence over the Inner Asian Zone well to the west of what it had been before. Another example of the changing nature of these zones is the case of Japan which at times was part of the Sinic Zone while at other times a part of the Outer Zone.

This zonal model of the Chinese world is useful in illustrating the differences in China's foreign relations with the various non-Chinese states. States in the Sinic Zone were treated in a less aggressive manner by China

than those in the Inner Asian Zone. Sinic Zone states were, as has been said, more easily sinicized than were the nomadic peoples of Central Asia. Furthermore, they posed less of a military threat to China than did the nomadic cavalry. As a result, these areas were considered a buffer zone but were, by and large, not occupied. So long as these states conducted themselves as proper tributaries, there was little Chinese inclination to intervene in their affairs.²⁷

The more apparent cultural differences between China and the Inner Asian Zone peoples, however, caused relations to be conducted differently. China showed no real desire to colonize Central Asia per se as these arid regions were unsuitable for the agriculture-based Chinese lifestyle. The military threat posed by the various central Asian tribes, however, necessitated China's separation of herself from this region to her west. To this end, a system of protectorate states, all of which acknowledged some degree of dependency on China, was established. China established its influence over these protectorates through treaties, marriage alliances, bestowal of titles of nobility, the payment of subsidies, or military conquest.²⁸ The goal was a zone of Chinese influence which could be manipulated through diplomacy or other direct or indirect means. The well known tactic of using barbarians

to control barbarians was a means to this end as was the Sung's payment of tribute to the Liao and Chin Empires.

From the above it is evident that sinocentrism was more than an expression of cultural superiority; it also represented a concept for defending China. Using a variety of techniques, the Chinese sought to surround themselves with a series of buffer states and protectorates over which they exercised a degree of control. Thus emerges another concept of traditional Chinese foreign relations: the domination of states on her borders.

Another principle of traditional Chinese foreign relations which is evident from the previous discussion of the tributary system is isolationism. From as early as Han times, Pan Ku's dictum to minimize contact with the Outer peoples has been practiced by the Chinese. The network of protectorates and buffer states described above was intended to separate China from barbarian peoples. The strict limitations on the frequency and size of tribute-bearing missions admitted to China further illustrates this preference for isolation from the rest of the world. So imbedded in Chinese thinking was this concept that it was not until the Treaty of Tientsin in 1858, that the Chinese, in a major concession to the west, permitted the permanent residence of Western embassies in the Chinese capital. This desire for separation is, of

course, a manifestation of China's belief in her cultural superiority. It also reflects her concern for her defenses and security.

Closely related to China's desire for isolation was her feeling of self-sufficiency. China saw herself as possessing all things cultural, economic, philosophical, etc.; that could possibly be needed. As a result she had no requirement to conduct trade or other forms of interaction with the barbarians. The minimal trade and exchange of gifts permitted under the tributary system was a boon conferred on the barbarians by the generous and benevolent Son of Heaven. This attitude of self-sufficiency appears to have been supported by the large number of Central Asian and Arab merchants who sought to enter China for trade as compared to less noticeable reciprocal action by the Chinese. This feeling of self-sufficiency was, of course, compatible with Pan Ku's theory of separation of Inner and Outer peoples.

A final concept of traditional Chinese foreign policy was that it was not, as a rule, expansionist in nature. Chinese history abounds with the military exploits of Han Wu-ti, T'ang T'ai-tsung, Ming Yung-lo, and other great empire builders. These men were responsible for vastly expanding the frontiers of the empires of their day; however, these men appear as exceptions rather than the norm among emperors. These men

ruled during the early yeras of their respective dynasties, when their dynasties were strong and vigorous. Their successors, who perhaps enjoyed too much of the glory created, ruled during the majority of China's history. These successors were often seemingly content to leave the borders as they were and frequently oversaw the contraction of these borders. The Chinese appear to have avoided trying to expand to the west as did the Mongols under Chinggis Khan. It would seem that China, as the foremost civilization in East Asia, if not the world, could have so expanded if she had been so inclined. Rather than expansionistic, the Chinese seemed content just to protect their civilization in China. In a larger sense, their various military conquests in Central Asia would appear to have been preemptive attacks on threatening nomadic tribes (or efforts to build the previously discussed protectorates) rather than efforts to annex new territories for colonization in a western sense.

Non-expansionism then is a concept of traditional foreign relations closely related to isolationism. From the previous discussion of te, it was evident that the Chinese considered use of force in foreign relations acceptable so long as the ruler involved possessed virtue. Since Chinese Emperors ruled, in theory, only because they had and exercised virtue, it would seem legitimate for them to exercise

military power against their neighbors. Thus, it appears that the Chinese had a theoretical justification for being expansionist; yet, as a rule, they were not. Instead of expanding their empires, Chinese Emperors were generally content with the borders they inherited. This would seem indicative of their preference for isolationism. Being self-sufficient, they had no need to expand and thus mingle with the inferior Outer peoples.

Two concepts of traditional foreign relations which are often cited but will not be included in this paper are impartiality and non-interference. Impartiality, again an outgrowth of Chinese superiority, maintained that all tributary states were equal before the Son of Heaven although lower in position than China. As a result of this equality, all tributaries were accorded equal treatment by the Emperor. Although this may have been the theoretical case, in reality, as shown in the discussion of the different methods for dealing with Sinic Zone and Inner Asian Zone states, it was not practiced. If there was any actual truth in the principle of impartiality, it was only reflected in the rituals of the tributary system as all emissaries performed the Kowtow in the prescribed manner.

The second concept, non-interference, and its corollary, non-exploitation, are also variations of the concept of superiority. It followed that because of her greatness, China had no need to interfere or exploit the barbarians. In a sense this is born out by the already discussed concept of

isolation and non-expansionism. However, examination of the methods used by the Chinese (marriage alliance, subsidies, conquest) to control the various states on her borders, reveal that China was not only not above interfering in the affairs of such states, but she frequently manipulated them through whatever means possible, to insure that they served her interests as protectorates and buffers.

Because of these apparent artificial qualities and their obvious conflict with more demonstrable concepts, impartiality and non-interference/non-exploitation will not be considered viable concepts of traditional Chinese foreign relations.

To determine the influence of traditional Chinese foreign relations concepts on modern foreign relations, it is now necessary to characterize the latter. Unfortunately, as indicated earlier, this is no easy task due to the erratic quality in foreign relations that China has shown to date. Also, the relative brevity of modern Chinese foreign relations (28 years) as compared to the more than two millenia of traditional foreign relations makes determination of long-term trends, in comparison, more difficult. In view of this dilemma, it is perhaps best to examine modern Chinese

foreign relations from the perspective of her foreign policy objectives and her actions to implement these objectives. Since foreign policy objectives represent consciously established goals, use of them as a framework for examining foreign relations will, hopefully, emphasize those features of China's foreign relations which she considers most important. Use of basically consistent foreign policy objectives should best illustrate her attitudes and concepts on this subject. Examination of her various foreign relations strategies and tactics is considered less useful as these would tend to change from time to time and from country to country.

Among the first statements dealing with the objectives of modern Chinese foreign policy was Article 54 of the Common Program adopted by the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference in September 1949. According to this document:

The principle of the foreign policy of the People's Republic of China is protection of the independence, freedom, integrity of territory and sovereignty of the country, the upholding of lasting international peace and friendly cooperation between the peoples of all countries, and opposition to the imperialist policy of aggression and war.²⁹

Since little has been published by the PRC which officially and systematically explains her foreign policy objectives beyond this, her current objectives must be inferred from actual events, propaganda statements and policy statements.³⁰ The list

of objectives below has been so compiled by Robert C. North:

1. Maintenance of the security and integrity of the PRC.
2. Efforts to seize Taiwan.
3. The unification under Peking of outlying or alienated territories that the leadership considers to be rightfully integral parts of the PRC.
4. The (outward) adjustment of Chinese boundaries in the Himalayas and elsewhere.
5. The protection and enhancement of Chinese Communist power and influence, especially in adjoining regions of Asia, and also in competition with the U.S.S.R.
6. The development of "bargain basement" methods of influencing Asian, African and Latin American countries by economic and technical assistance and by advice on guerrilla warfare, and political and economic policy.³¹

To better understand these foreign policy objectives, it is necessary to examine them from the perspective of events. By studying China's efforts to implement them, it should be possible to determine the concepts which underpin modern Chinese foreign relations.

The first foreign policy objective cited, "maintenance of the security and integrity of the PRC" is, of course, basic and fundamental in nature to all states. This objective refers to all actions taken by China to prevent invasion of her borders and to safeguard her people and territorial integrity. In pursuit to this goal China has employed an array of tactics ranging from warnings to open war. China's

propensity to act with force and dispatch when she has felt threatened has been heightened, no doubt, by the humiliation and dismemberment to which she was subjected during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Obvious Chinese actions based on this objective include her intervention in the Korean War, her 1962 attack on Indian troops in Tibet, and her 1969 attack on Soviet troops on Chanpao Island in the Ussuri River. In the latter two examples, China was reacting to the presence of her opponent's forces on territory she considered to be hers. In the case of Korea, China was reacting to a perceived fear that the United Nations forces would advance through her buffer, North Korea, and into her industrial heart in Manchuria. Related in nature to her Korean War actions were China's adjustment of troop dispositions adjacent to Laos in 1964 and North Vietnam in 1965. In each of these cases China made defensive preparations to counter a perceived threat to her security.

The second Chinese foreign policy objective deals with the restoration of mainland control over the former island province of Taiwan. Feeling Taiwan to be a part of the empire that has devolved to them from the Manchus, the Chinese Communists see the maintenance of a separate regime on Taiwan as an unnecessary prolongation of their revolution and an unfinished part in their effort to consolidate their rule in China. It was apparent that the Communists were preparing to retake Taiwan by force in 1950 when their

efforts were frustrated by Truman's decision to interpose the U.S. Seventh Fleet between Taiwan and the mainland. The subsequent Taiwan Straits Crises of 1954, 1958 and 1962 were efforts to cause the U.S. to withdraw its support for the Chiang regime on Taiwan. With the U.S. gone, the Communists hoped to seize the island militarily.

Since the early 1960's, however, use of overt military pressure has subsided somewhat and the PRC has begun to use diplomatic means to achieve the desired restoration. Arguing that there can only be one legitimate Chinese government and that Taiwan is a part of China, the PRC has consistently refused to establish diplomatic relations with nations recognizing Taiwan. The Taiwan government has, in like manner, maintained that there can be but one China and has refused to establish diplomatic relations with those nations recognizing Peking. As a result, both the PRC and the ROC (Taiwan) governments have engaged in active competition to win recognition at the expense of the other. Although initially difficult, the PRC's efforts have proved effective as was signified by her replacing Taiwan as the representative of China in the United Nations in 1971.

Although the PRC has made great diplomatic programs vis à vis Taiwan, she has yet to accomplish her goal of reincorporating that island into her borders. As a result,

she has continued to use recognition and other relations as a means to pry away support from Taiwan. U.S. recognition of Taiwan has prevented the establishment of full Sino-U.S. relations despite their hopeful start in 1972. Even though Japan and the PRC have established full diplomatic relations, the PRC has used Japanese trade and investment in Taiwan as an excuse for not developing closer economic ties. As it appears now, Taiwan will remain a major concern of Chinese foreign policy until it is restored to mainland control.

Closely related in nature to the Taiwan issue are the third and fourth foreign policy objectives: "unification under Peking of the outlying or alienated territories that the Chinese leadership considers to be rightfully integral parts of the PRC" and "the adjustment of Chinese boundaries in the Himalayas and elsewhere." China's perception of her rightful territory stems from the Ch'ing abdication in 1912 when the Empress Dowager, Lung Yu, charged the dynasty's successors to form the Republic of China "by the union as heretofore of the five peoples, namely, Manchus, Chinese, Mongols, Mohammedans (Turkic peoples) and Tibetans, together with their territory."³² Since then, Chinese leaders from Sun Yat-sen to the present leadership have claimed for China all territory once a part of the Ch'ing, China's largest empire. In an

effort to solidify these territorial claims, the PRC has acted with force. PLA units were dispatched to Sinkiang and Tibet in 1949 and 1950 to firmly establish Communist Chinese control in these areas. It is reported that in 1949, one of Mao's first requests as the new ruler of China of his ally Stalin, was the restoration of Chinese suzerainty over the Mongolian People's Republic. This traditional relationship had been abrogated earlier by the Chiang government. Stalin refused, which prompted Mao to make the same request again in 1954 of Khrushchev. He was again refused³³ thus providing another issue in the later-to-emerge Sino-Soviet dispute.

Disagreements as to the proper location of borders has led to Chinese military involvement on several occasions, the most prominent being the 1962 Sino-Indian War and the 1969 Sino-Soviet border clash on the Ussuri River. In both cases, the Chinese have claimed the other party's demarcation of the border to have been invalid. Their arguments to this end have maintained that these borders were forced upon her by western powers during her period of weakness in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In both cases, the Chinese have demanded that the borders be adjusted in their favor.

Concern for borders has been a major diplomatic, as well as military, preoccupation of modern Chinese foreign relations. As was mentioned earlier, China was disinclined to establish delimited and demarcated borders during her Imperial years. This lack of concern coupled with her military weakness enabled the British, French and Russians to conclude border agreements with her that have been found unsatisfactory in the post-1949 era. To remedy this situation, Chou En-lai announced at the 1955 Bandung Conference that China was willing to peacefully negotiate borders with her neighbors. Since then, borders have been established through negotiations with Burma, Nepal, Pakistan, and Mongolian People's Republic and Afghanistan. Borders with Korea, Vietnam and Laos, although imposed on the parties by the Japanese and French respectively, have been found to be mutually agreeable. The border with India has, of course, been established in the aftermath of the 1962 war. Currently, the only border with which the Chinese find fault is that with the Soviet Union. Although border negotiations were started after the Ussuri River clash, substantive progress has not yet been made. The basic problem underlying this impasse is China's claim to what has become the Soviet Maritime Province and other contiguous areas which the Chinese claim were wrongfully taken from her by the 1858 Treaty of Aigun and the 1860 Treaty of Tientsin. Obviously favorable resolution of borders remains an important Chinese foreign policy objective.

The fifth Chinese foreign policy objective is "the protection and enhancement of Chinese Communist power and influence, especially in adjoining regions of Asia, and also in competition with the USSR." The first half of this proposition is partially related to China's previously discussed concern for her security. In this respect, Chinese actions in Asia can be interpreted as efforts to bolster her defensive position. The second half of this objective reflects Chinese ambitions to replace the Soviet Union as the most influential communist power. In pursuit of these objectives, China was attempted to follow a path in foreign relations separate from both of the superpowers and designed to win her followers throughout the world.

The importance China attaches to building her power and influence in Asia is the direct result of what she sees as the threat to her security posed by her being encircled first by the U.S. and more recently by the U.S.S.R. China, of course, came to fear and distrust the intentions of the U.S. during the Korean War as U.S. forces threatened her Manchurian flank from the Korean Peninsula and U.S. naval forces seemingly threatened her southeastern provinces from the Taiwan Straits. Furthermore the U.S. had declared itself the ally of the Chiang government on Taiwan, the PRC's civil war opponent. From this beginning, U.S. intentions became

more ominous with her conclusion of four bilateral defense agreements with South Korea, Japan, Taiwan and the Philippines. In addition, the U.S. created two Asian-based collective security pacts: the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO). The aim of both of these was to curb the growth of Chinese influence in Asia. Also during the early 1950s, the U.S. began to actively supply French forces attempting to suppress the Chinese-supported Viet Minh in Vietnam. In addition to these efforts, U.S. rhetoric had taken a decidedly anti-PRC tone and the U.S. had established military installations in South Korea, Japan, Okinawa, and Taiwan. It appeared to China that areas that had once been her tributaries and had served her as buffers, were now occupied by forces clearly hostile to her.

In the late 1960s and 1970s, China also began to suspect the Soviet Union of plotting to encircle her. This was, of course, another factor in the more general Sino-Soviet Rift. Indications of this Soviet encirclement effort were the close Soviet ties with India, itself a major enemy of China; Soviet attempts to court the various Southeast Asian nations, especially North Vietnam, with aid; and Soviet overtures toward Japan. Making these diplomatic gestures more ominous was the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and the announcement of the Brezhnev Doctrine. The latter made

clear Russia's intentions to intervene in the internal affairs of socialist states when it felt doing so was necessary to preserve order in the Communist world. This doctrine seemed quite chilling from the Chinese point of view as an estimated fifty Soviet Army divisions and an assortment of nuclear weapons were positioned along the Sino-Soviet border. To complete this perception of Russian encirclement, the U.S.S.R., in 1969, offered to underwrite a collective security system for Southeast Asia designed to check "expansionism" as well as imperialism. China was clearly the target of this effort.³⁴

Because of these perceived threats to her security by the two superpowers, China has attempted to strengthen her position in Asia in a variety of ways. Her first effort was through "peaceful coexistence" and the Bandung Spirit of cooperation. One interpretation of the Chinese Bandung period was that it was intended to destroy the U.S. alliance systems (i.e., SEATO, CENTO, etc.) by wooing away the Asian members. In this vein, such tactics were dropped in the 1957-1958 period in part, because they failed to break up these alliances.³⁵

In pursuit of Asian friends, China, as previously noted, attempted to settle peacefully a number of border questions with her neighbors. As a counter to pro-Soviet India, China began to court Pakistan in 1962. Other actions to build her following in Asia were the development of close ties with

Indonesia, at least until 1965 when that nation's pro-Peking Sukarno regime was deposed by a coup. Relations with North Korea were solidified in 1961 with a formal military alliance and China became a regular supporter of Ho Chi-minh's efforts in the Vietnam War. A clear pattern is evident from these efforts: China has used a wide range of diplomatic devices to win to her side the various Asian nations that surround her.

The Sino-Indian War of 1962, previously discussed as it pertained to China's concern for her borders, also reflects her efforts to build her stature and influence in Asia. India and China emerged from the Bandung Conference as the leaders of the Third World. Some have interpreted China's failure to apply "peaceful coexistence" to the disputed border question as reflecting a desire to humiliate India militarily and thus reduce her influence. At least in humiliating India, China was surely successful.

A second facet of this fifth foreign policy objective is China's effort to replace the Soviet Union as the most influential communist power. Like many of the differences between the Chinese and the Russians, this foreign policy objective has its roots in the post-Stalin era when cracks began to appear in the monolithic Communist world. As the Soviet-dominated Communist bloc began to show signs of polycentricism, China began to exert her independence. China differed with the Soviet model for development and promoted Mao, rather

than Khrushchev, as the successor theoretician to Marx, Engles, Lenin and Stalin. These differences, plus Russia's failure to support fully China's nuclear and economic development, led to a high level of animosity.

A major result of Sino-Soviet hostility has been fierce competition for influence in the Third World and within the Communist bloc. On the rhetorical level, the Chinese have denounced the Soviets as "revisionists" and accused them of "social imperialism." The Chinese have castigated the Russians for acting in collusion with the U.S. to the detriment of the worldwide proletarian revolution. In place of the Soviet model, the Chinese have advanced their revolution and concept of economic and social development as an example of the developing Third World.

Competition between China and the U.S.S.R. has been evident beyond the theoretical/rhetorical level. As noted earlier, China's support for Pakistan is predicated on the latter's hostility toward Soviet-backed India. During the Angolan Civil War, China and Russia backed rival factions. Recent reports from Zaire indicate that the Chinese are supporting the Mobutu government largely because it opposes the Soviet-supported Katangese rebels.³⁶ In each example, China has based its giving of support on the regime's taking an anti-Soviet stance, not on any ideological affinity. This same type of competition is evident in the frequent

fracturing of Communist parties into Maoist and pro-Soviet wings.

Expressing this anti-Soviet sentiment most clearly is the concept of "anti-hegemony" which the Chinese have promoted since the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué. This concept, which the Chinese have attempted to incorporate in all joint announcements and agreements with other nations, declares that neither party will seek hegemony in Asia. Furthermore, both parties to the agreement pledge their opposition to the attempt of any third nation to establish hegemony in Asia. The obvious target of the "anti-hegemony" clause has been the Soviet Union. China has been successful in incorporating this clause into joint press communiqués with nineteen nations.³⁷ A notable exception to Chinese success in this regard has been Japan and negotiations toward a Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty. Japan fears that her signing of a document containing the anti-hegemony clause will alienate the Soviet Union and sour their relations.

From the data presented concerning this fifth foreign policy objective it is evident that Chinese foreign relations and policies have been directed against what China perceives as threats to her security. By building her prestige and influence with her Asian neighbors, she is attempting to counter U.S. and Soviet encirclement of her borders. By building her prestige and influence in the Communist world and by competing with the Soviet Union in the Third World, China has

attempted to make definite strides towards replacing the Soviet Union as the leader of the Communist world.

The sixth and final foreign policy objective is "the development of 'bargain basement' methods of influencing Asian, African and Latin American countries by economic and technical assistance and advice on guerrilla warfare and political and economic policy." This objective can be viewed as China's attempt to build her influence in the Third World in a manner consistent with her limited economic and military capabilities. As implied above, the purpose of this objective is to build China's standing in the Third World. In practice it means building her influence at the expense of the United States and the Soviet Union. Realization of China's ambitions for leadership in the Third World has been restricted by the reality of her rather meager means. Although China has risen to become the sixth largest economy based on her GNP, when considered with her population, she ranks only 101 in per capita GNP.³⁸ When viewed from this perspective, China has difficulty in competing financially with the superpowers, or even medium-sized powers, for influence with developing countries.

In terms of military capability, China is also limited. Although the People's Liberation Army (PLA) numbers between 2.5 and 3 million men in its regular component and is probably the world's largest ground force, it is woefully ill-prepared to wage modern conventional war. Although it

may seem an impressive guerrilla force, its lack of mechanization, fire power and logistical base leave it hard pressed to conduct offensive operations beyond its borders for any length of time. In the future, China may acquire greater influence because of her nuclear armament. However, to date, her lack of a delivery system in sufficient numbers and of sufficient quality downgrades the deterrent quality of her force. Against the U.S.S.R. or the U.S., the only two powers against whom she would seem likely to use nuclear weapons, her capability seems most unimpressive.

Despite the handicap of these limitations, China has since 1949 held herself up as a model to be emulated by other developing nations and an alternative to the leadership of the superpowers. Emphasizing her non-Western and semi-colonial roots, China has recommended her revolution as applicable to the colonial and semi-colonial nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Also, stressing these "have not nation" origins, she has advanced her economic and development model as worthy of emulation by developing nations. Thus, despite certain limitations in her capabilities, China, as will be shown below, has made use of foreign assistance efforts and the promotion of her revolutionary and economic development models to build her influence in the Third World.

In the realm of foreign aid, China's efforts, as has been noted, have been restricted by her less than abundant resources. Her most notable achievement in this regard has been the provision of a \$336 million loan for the building of the Tanzania-Zambia Railway.³⁹ Between 1956 and 1959, Chinese foreign aid averaged a total of \$30 million a year and was provided to Cambodia, Indonesia, Ceylon, Nepal, the UAR and Yemen. Since 1960, China's aid has averaged \$125 million annually and has been disbursed among twenty-one nations: 8 in Asia, 10 in Africa, and 3 in the Middle East.⁴⁰

In 1964, Chou En-lai announced eight principles which would govern China's foreign aid program:

1. Equality and mutual benefit.
2. Respect for the sovereignty of other countries.
3. The availability of interest-free or low interest loans with flexible time limits.
4. Encouragement of self-reliance and independent economic development.
5. Building projects requiring less investment and yielding quicker results.
6. Providing quality equipment and materials of Chinese manufacture.
7. Mastering of techniques by personnel of the recipient country.
8. Expectation that Chinese Communist experts and advisory personnel would restrict themselves to the standard of living to which their counterparts in the recipient countries were accustomed.⁴¹

These principles and the operation of the program to date reflect four major features. First, the providing of loans at low interest rates is clearly intended to contrast with Soviet aid which is commonly less generously provided. Also, the nations receiving aid from China are not selected because of their ideological similarity to China. Communist as well as non-Communist states have been selected so long as they have been sufficiently anti-Soviet and/or U.S. to suit China. Thirdly, this program seems to foster a spirit of cooperation and unity of purpose. This is perhaps in contrast to the Chinese experience with Soviet aid during the late 1950s when Soviet experts were recalled, leaving their Chinese students not fully trained and projects incompletd. Finally, this program endeavors to promote the Chinese economic ideals of self-reliance and self-help. Aid projects coupled with various exchange programs try to show the leaders of various developing nations that China's labor-intensive, low-capital and agriculture-based economy offers an attractive and workable model for their emulation.

China's efforts to build her influence in the Third World by promoting People's War and Wars of National Liberation are probably better known in the West than are her just described economic efforts. So great was the volume of

Chinese rhetoric on revolution during the early 1960's that a number of authors have considered the spread of revolution to be one of China's principal foreign policy objectives.⁴² In the 1960s this surely seemed to have been the case and, as a result, many U.S. officials interpreted Lin Piao's 1965 speech, "Long Live the Victory of People's War," as an indication that China planned to increase her support to various revolutionary groups throughout the world. Analysis and the less violent Chinese rhetoric of the 1970's however, has convinced many students of China's foreign relations that this is not the case.⁴³ Although she has continued to maintain that revolution is historically inevitable and that her revolution is a model for others to follow, China has also stressed that revolutions are the product of local conditions and, as such, are not exportable. This, plus her belief in self-reliance, has provided China with a theoretical rationale for supporting revolution heavily in words, but minimally in material. Instead of providing massive arms shipments and "volunteers" to assist various revolutionary groups, China has generally provided advice, moral support and very limited quantities of supplies. This program has proved advantageous in that it has subjected China to little risk of retaliation and has not required large expenditures of her limited resources. The major exception to this has been the support provided North Vietnam. In this case,

because of Vietnam's proximity to China and the consequent fear that North Vietnamese defeat would place an enemy on her southern flank, China has proved much more generous and provided North Vietnam with substantial aid and 50,000 railway troops.

From this examination of modern Chinese foreign policy objectives, which, in theory, are indicative of China's conscious efforts to direct the course of her foreign relations, two major trends emerge. The first of these is a preoccupation with security. China has shown a willingness to use all tactics from "peaceful coexistence" to military force to defend not only the territory actually under her control but to seize that which she considers rightfully hers. In this regard, China has made a clear effort to bolster her influence in Asia, through diplomacy, foreign aid, advice and, when necessary, force. While building her own stature, she has attempted to erode the position of her principal opponents, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.

China's second major foreign relations preoccupation has been to seek a position of leadership in the world. Obviously, this is also a facet of her defensive designs as described above. However, the range of her activity in pursuing this goal would seem to make it an end in itself

rather than just a means to build her defenses. China has actively competed with the Soviet Union for leadership of the Communist world. She has actively sought to woo the various Third World nations to her side. More recently, she has made overtures to various developed nations to wrest them from U.S. influence. In all cases she has attempted to project herself as a strong, progressive nation offering a viable alternative to what she calls U.S. imperialism and Soviet social imperialism.

From these two trends it is now possible to perceive similarities between the foreign relations of modern China and the foreign relations concepts identified earlier as reflective of traditional China.

The modern concern for defense is in many ways similar to the traditional concept of isolationism both in attitude and in practice. The rigid controls of the tributary system were intended to limit barbarian access to China. To make these controls enforceable, traditional China was surrounded by a system of buffer states and protectorates referred to earlier as the Sinic Zone and the Inner Asian Zone. These states served to absorb the impact of barbarian attack and to provide a barrier, much like the Great Wall, to unwanted entrance into the Middle Kingdom. In a modern sense, China has acted to isolate herself from what now is perceived as presenting the same threat as the ancient nomadic tribes of

Central Asia: the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. To ward off this perceived danger, China has attempted to create a new buffer zone on her borders. Her intervention in the Korean War was a reaction to preserve her buffer in the northeast: North Korea. Her 1962 war with India can be seen as an effort to retain control of her traditional buffer, Tibet. China's unusually large support for the North Vietnamese reflects a concern for this buffer in the face of U.S. attack. Besides these more notable instances, China has disbursed foreign aid and peacefully concluded border agreements with her neighbors so as to build a zone of friendly states on her periphery. The intent of all these efforts has been to eliminate a perceived threat from her flank regions. In this way, China has acted to isolate herself from military danger.

China has also employed a form of isolationism in her diplomacy. Upon coming to power in 1949, Mao announced the policy of "leaning to one side." By this he meant that a nation could only be pro-Communist or pro-Western, there could be no middle ground. This division of the world into opposing camps, in many ways reminiscent of the traditional Outer people/Inner people concept, has been used in varying degrees as a diplomatic tool ever since. By viewing the world through this "our side-their side" perspective, China has isolated herself from full interaction with parts of the

world. An obvious example is China's refusal to establish diplomatic relations with any nation recognizing Taiwan. In like manner, China has recently been disinclined to deal with states friendly to Russia. In this regard, China has opted for closer ties with her arch enemy, the U.S., as a counterweight against Russian threats and pressure. Although these examples cannot be construed as an effort by China to wall off outside contacts entirely, they do represent a conscious effort by the Chinese to regulate contact with other nations based on their acceptance of Chinese views. Although compatibility of views is a factor in the foreign relations of all states, few appear to use it as conspicuously as does China. In this respect then, China's diplomacy can be seen as having an isolationist bent.

Closely related to political isolationism has been China's economic isolation from the outside world. Under the tributary system, trade was conducted with the various barbarian merchants as a boon conferred upon them by the Son of Heaven. It was an act of benevolence on the part of the Emperor that prompted trade, certainly not Chinese need. The basis for this feeling was China's seeming self-sufficiency.

Adherence to this principle, in the modern name of self-reliance, is evident in the relative paucity of China's foreign trade. Clearly there are other restrictive factors such as a lack of foreign exchange, a lack of products suitable for

overseas sales, and the preponderance of her economic effort going to agriculture and defense-related projects. Nevertheless, China's attitude toward Japan's efforts to expand their mutual trade has reflected genuine ambivalence toward international trade. In response to Japan's initiatives, China has seemingly returned trade to the traditional status of a boon which she confers in return for a Japanese kowtow. Prior to the establishment of formal diplomatic relations in 1972, Sino-Japanese trade was conducted under the Liao-Takasaki Memorandum and through Japanese companies considered "friendly" by China. In both cases, the principal conditions for gaining trade with China was not Chinese economic need but submission to the Chinese position on certain political questions. Frequently, this submission was manifest in Japanese signing of a trade memorandum which severely criticized the Japanese government and its policies. It was apparent from this arrangement that China saw no particular necessity to trade with Japan. Feeling herself self-sufficient, she chose to use trade as a means of securing political goals. This self-sufficient outlook is also evident in China's refusal to accept long-term credit to finance foreign purchases. Although this is also interpreted as a fear of the indebtedness of her early-Republican years, it also indicates an economic self-assurance based on a long held belief in self-sufficiency.

In addition to isolationism, the modern concern for defense is illustrative of the traditional Chinese concept of non-expansionism. As previously noted, China's ability to entertain expansionist designs is restricted by her limited military and economic capabilities. Nevertheless, with the comparative weakness of her neighbors, at least those to her south, a China so inclined could strive to increase her influence beyond her borders through military means. If not by direct force, China could accomplish this through greater support of People's Wars against governments she found objectionable. However, despite the frequently militant tone of her propaganda, China has not, as a rule, seemed interested in expansionism.

As noted previously, China has not used her armed forces against another country except when she has perceived a threat to her security. She has also avoided the impression of having expansionist designs in her support of Wars of National Liberation. With the exception of Vietnam, which was perceived as a potential threat, China's support to various insurgencies has been quite limited in scope and frequently has not exceeded the moral support level. In contrast to expansionism, China has shown a willingness to coexist with non-Communist neighbors so long as they are not pro-U.S. or pro-U.S.S.R. in political orientation. For example, China has maintained generally friendly relations with the neutralist government in Burma

and did so with the neutralist government of Prince Sihanouk in Cambodia. Relations with the latter, however, became less cordial when Sihanouk was deposed by the pro-U.S. Lon Nol government. In this same vein, China has maintained ties with Pakistan because of the latter's hostility to another of China's enemies, India. It is significant that in both Burma and Cambodia, there were on-going Communist oriented insurgencies aimed at overthrowing their neutralist leaders. Despite these opportunities to exploit revolutionary activity, China exhibited only minimal interest in the insurgent forces and continued instead to support the neutralist leadership. In contrast, China has supported insurgent efforts in South Vietnam and Thailand. In both of these cases, U.S. presence enhanced Chinese interests in and support of the conflicts. It would appear then that China has had the opportunity to act as an expansionist but has chosen not to do so. In this way, China has shown a willingness to coexist with states on her borders, regardless of their ideological convictions, so long as they are not overly influenced by a hostile superpower.

The second major preoccupation in modern Chinese foreign relations is her apparent quest for leadership in the world. Her actions, it has been noted, seem directed, in part,

toward gaining recognition as the leading nation of the Communist world. She has taken still other actions aimed at building her stature among the nations of the Third World. These efforts seem, quite logically, to reflect her traditional self-perception of superiority. Recognizing exactly how this is reflected requires further examination.

As was mentioned in the discussion of traditional foreign relations, the Chinese concept of superiority was based on her culture. The culture of traditional China was seen by the Chinese as superior to that of her neighbors and, in accordance with the Chinese political theory, because of this superiority, it was appropriate for China to be the dominant state in the world. What is most significant is that China considered her greatness to be the product of her Confucian beliefs or ideology. This ideology provided the answers to all her problems and because she followed its precepts, so the theory went, she was virtuous and hence greater than all other states.

Similarly, modern Chinese foreign relations is based, in theory, on what is perceived as a superior idea, Marxism-Leninism-Thought of Mao Tse-tung. This ideology, like Confucianism, is seen as providing the answers to various problems and as establishing the proper way to reach the superior civilization found in full Communism. Just as their

imperial predecessors saw Confucian truths as the key to their position of world domination, the modern Chinese Communists have used the "truth" of their ideology as the basis for claiming leadership in the world.

The most evident example of Chinese efforts in this regard has emerged from the Sino-Soviet **R**ift. A major issue in this dispute has dealt with proper interpretation of Marxism-Leninism and the proper method for achieving full communism. The Chinese have vehemently denounced the Soviets as revisionists who are regressing to capitalism and guilty of imperialistic ambitions. In place of the Russian model of development, the Chinese endorse the writings of Mao Tse-tung as the proper interpretation of Marxism-Leninism. The Chinese purpose in exposing the heresy of Russia's "goulash Communism" seems to reflect more than a concern for ideological purity; it reflects a Chinese interest in replacing Russia as the leader of the Communist world. Their claim to this role is not their military or economic might, but the power of their superior ideology.

The Chinese have attempted to use their "superior idea," at least the portion of it dealing with revolution, to influence the nations of the Third World. Throughout the early 1960s,

China promoted the idea of Wars of National Liberation as the way for Third World nations to break away from the economic grasp of the American led neo-imperialists. In 1964, Chou En-lai commented on this subject and pronounced Africa ripe for revolution. The next year, Lin Piao delivered his well-known speech, "Long Live the Victory of People's War," extolling the virtues of the Chinese model of revolution and predicting the encirclement of the "urban," Capitalistic areas of Europe and North America by the revolutionary forces of the world's "countryside" in Asia, Africa and Latin America. These references coupled with other rhetoric are indicative of China's efforts to gain a leading role in the Third World based on her image as a revolutionary power.

Obviously, the ritual and ceremony once associated with Chinese foreign relations have given way to modern diplomatic procedures. China has, likewise, discarded many of the practices of foreign relations which were based on her self-image of cultural superiority. Like other states, China now accepts and abides by the European concepts of nation-state, equality among nation-states, and the need for defined borders between them. Despite these concessions to modern world thought, China, as has been shown, retains some of the attitudes toward the outside world that characterized her imperial era. Despite her admission to the United Nations, the diplomatic mainstream

of international relations, China retains a degree of separation from the rest of the world. Rather than attempting to expand her place in the world through military means, she has chosen to remain non-expansionist. Rather than exploiting the full capabilities of her economy through international trade, she has retained an air of self-sufficiency. Despite her radical change in ideology, she still maintains her belief in the superiority of her idea and sees it as justifying her efforts to gain a place of leadership.

Many of the concepts and attitudes which are attributed to tradition in this paper can and have been interpreted by others as reflecting nationalism, ideological convictions, etc. Nevertheless, there are definite similarities and parallels between the traditional and the modern foreign relations. Because such similarities do exist, appraisal of modern foreign relations events from the perspective of tradition can be considered useful. It may not provide a complete explanation of events but then, neither do other techniques.

A final point which should be addressed is the ultimate aim of modern Chinese foreign relations. In the traditional Chinese world order, China was clearly the dominant state and there was no concept of equality between China and other states.

It is a logical extension of the previous discussion to inquire as to China's ambitions to establish a similar world order in the future. Although Chinese rhetoric espouses equality among states and condemns U.S. and Soviet imperialism, her desire to reclaim the previous imperial territories and the persistence of certain traditional Chinese foreign relations concepts raises this larger question. At this time, there is no data available to confirm Chinese plans to reestablish the Middle Kingdom; however, it is a matter worthy of further study and speculation.

FOOTNOTES

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32. A. Edmund Clubb, The International Position of Communist China, p. 426.
33. A. Edmund Clubb, Twentieth Century China, p. 426.
34. Melvin Gurtou, "Sino-Soviet Relations and Southeast Asia," Pacific Affairs, pp. 496-497, Winter 1970-1971.
35. David Mozingo, "China Looks at Asia," China: Co-Existence or Containment, p. 39.
36. "A Little Help from His Friends," Time, p. 41.
37. Joachin Glaubitz, "Anti-Hegemony Formulas in Chinese Foreign Policy," Asian Survey, p. 214, March 1976.

38. Robert C. North, op. cit., p. 19.
39. Bruce D. Larkin, China and Africa 1949-1970,
p. 99.
40. Robert C. North, op. cit., p. 133.
41. Ibid.
42. Harold C. Hinton, op. cit., p. 262.
43. Both Peter Van Ness in his book Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy and Chalmers Johnson in Autopsy on People's War express the belief that Chinese support to People's Wars is more rhetorical than material in nature.

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